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Abstract
In this experiment, we analyze the model of strategic trade policy proposed by Brander and Spencer
(1985). Governments can choose whether or not to subsidize domestic …rms. Firms compete in a
Cournot duopoly, and they know the subsidy decisions when choosing output. Although the theoretical
prediction is that …rms are subsidized, it turns out that governments only rarely subsidize in experi-
mental markets. Not subsidizing is rational given our observation that …rms do not play according to
the subgame perfect equilibrium when subsidies are given.
V tomto experimentu analyzujeme model strategické obchodní politiky navrµ zené Branderem a Spen-
crem (1985). Vlády mohou zvolit, zda subvencovat domácí …rmy nebo ne. Firmy soutµ eµ zí v Cournotovµ e
duopolu a znají velikost subvence pµ ri volbµ e objemu výroby. Aµ ckoli teorie pµ redpokládá, µ ze …rmy jsou
subvencované, ukazuje se, µ ze na experimentálních trzích podporují vlády …rmy jen zµ rídka. Vzhledem
k našemu pozorování, µ ze …rmy nehrají podle subhernµ e–ideálních strategií v pµ rípadµ e zisku subvence,
strategie nesubvencovat je racionální.
JEL Classi…cation numbers: F13, L13, C92.
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11 Introduction
The model of strategic trade policy as proposed initially by Brander and Spencer (1985) is without a doubt
one of the most in‡uential ideas in both recent trade theory and trade policy. However, the empirical validity
of the model of strategic trade policy is still a much debated topic. A fundamental problem with most
empirical studies is that they usually make use of calibration models rather than …eld data estimation models
(see e.g., Baldwin and Krugman, 1988; Dixit, 1988; Krishna et al., 1994). The assumptions underlying the
calibration methods are sometimes ad hoc and the results may therefore not be particularly robust. Brander
(1995, p.1438) concludes that the importance of these “calibration exercises ... is for the light they shed
on the theoretical structure of strategic trade policy, rather than because of their empirical signi…cance.”
Given this methodological disclaimer, “it is safe to say that the jury is still out for the empirical evaluation
of trade policies” (Maggi, 1996, p.237).
In this paper, we report results from an experiment designed to test strategic trade policy in laboratory
markets. The experimental approach has been successfully applied in almost all areas of economics, in-
cluding applied and policy–orientated …elds like industrial organization, labor markets, public …nance and
macroeconomics (see Davis and Holt, 1993, for a survey). Previous experiments on issues in international
economics include the studies by Noussair et al. (1995) on the Ricardian trade theory, by Noussair et al.
(1997) on the principles of exchange rate determination, and by Ansic (1995) on trade hysteresis.
The experimental approach has several advantages compared to a …eld-data analysis of strategic trade
policy. In the laboratory, we can design markets exactly according to the assertions of the theory. By
doing so, we can provide conditions suited to making the theory work well. In our case, this amounts to
designing the markets precisely according to the original Brander and Spencer (1985) framework, although
in a simpli…ed manner. A second advantage concerns interpretation of the data. In …eld markets, there are
often market dynamics or other external factors that in‡uence the market outcome and which sometimes
make the interpretation of the data with respect to the e¤ect of the policy di¢cult. In the laboratory,
there are no such uncontrolled changes of the market determinants. As the cost and demand structure of
the market are given by design, the data can unambiguously be interpreted with respect to the underlying
theoretical model. A third advantage from running an experiment is that we can observe market outcomes
2for various combinations of government decisions. In the …eld, there is typically only one set of government
decisions under which a certain market can be analyzed.1 In the experiment, we can analyze the impact
of several di¤erent sets of subsidy decisions on …rm behavior. Given these three points, we believe that an
experimental investigation can lead to useful insights.
The experimental approach may also have disadvantages. Plott (1982, p.1522) lists, and rejects, the
most common ones. In connection with strategic trade policy, an obvious and important scepticism is that
decision making in the …eld is arguably much more complex than that in laboratory markets. Decision
makers in the …eld—here governments and …rms’ managers—decide in a very rich economic, social, and
political environment. In the laboratory, all these factors are missing, and subjects decide in a very
simpli…ed market environment. This objection is to be taken very seriously. However, it appears to us that
the simpli…ed environment of the laboratory may also be an advantage. If student subjects (who indeed
become the decision makers in the …eld later anyway) do not decide according to the prediction in the
experimental markets, can we expect the decision makers in the …eld to be closer? Should not the contrary
be true, since, compared to the pure incentive structure as replicated in the experiment, the additional
elements of a richer environment would cause further deviations from the theoretical prediction by blurring
the incentives? We think that studying both the simple experimental environment and the rich environment
in the …eld can lead to important insights. The experimental evidence should be seen as complementary to
the existing empirical literature on strategic trade policy.
We study a simple Cournot duopoly framework, matching the requirements of the Brander and Spencer
(1985) theory. There are two countries, each consisting of a government and a …rm, and the …rms export a
homogenous good to a third country. Governments simultaneously decide whether or not to subsidize their
…rm. Then, knowing the subsidy decisions of both governments, the …rms play a Cournot duopoly. The
criticism has been made (Krugman, 1993) that the appropriate strategic trade policy is highly sensitive to
details of the market structure. In particular, the policy conclusions derived from the Brander and Spencer
(1985) setup are reversed if the product market competition is characterized by strategic complementarity
1Grossman (1990) pointed out that …eld studies of strategic trade policy often focus on successful cases, leading to a
sample-selection bias.
3rather than strategic substitutability (Eaton and Grossman, 1986). By employing a standard Cournot
duopoly, we arguably give the Brander and Spencer (1985) prediction the best shot.
The payo¤s in the two-stage game are derived from linear demand and cost schedules. The payo¤s in
the experiment are exchanged into Deutschemarks at the end of the experiment. That is, there are real
monetary incentives and participants face precisely the incentives the theory asserts. All else equal, a …rm
has an incentive to increase its quantity when it is subsidized and to decrease its quantity when the other
…rm is subsidized. This implies that governments are in a prisoners’ dilemma situation: positive subsidies
occur in equilibrium but they lead to a Pareto inferior outcome.
Our main question in this experiment is whether or not governments actually subsidize their …rms.
That is, at a general level, we are simply testing the validity of the Brander and Spencer (1985) prediction
in experimental markets. At a more speci…c level, we are trying to gain insight into some peculiarities
underlying the theory. The core of the Brander and Spencer (1985) theory is that subsidies work as a
commitment device in international competition. This, in turn, requires that given the subsidy decisions,
…rms choose the subgame perfect output quantities in the second stage. However, Brander (1995, p.1449)
suggests that it is not certain that such subgame perfect decisions will always occur: “We might reasonably
believe that players can …nd a Nash equilibrium in a simple one-shot game. ... Expecting real players to
incorporate a sequential rationality requirement such as subgame perfection in simple games is asking a
lot more, and experimental subjects have a much harder time with this requirement.” If output decisions
at the …rm level are not subgame perfect, the rational choice of the governments may also di¤er from the
equilibrium prediction.
In addition, even if …rms make subgame perfect decisions, there is still the possibility of cooperation at
the government level. As mentioned, governments are in a prisoners’ dilemma situation. While the Brander
and Spencer (1985) theory is a static one, there is often repeated interaction among …rms and governments
in the …eld. Brander (1995) points out that with repeated interaction the results in the trade policy game
might di¤er as a consequence of possible cooperation. Therefore, an interesting design issue concerns the
nature of the interaction between the participants in the experiment. We deal with this problem by allowing
for two types of interaction. In one treatment type, two countries (that is, two government-…rm pairs) stay
4together as one interaction group for the entire course of the experiment. In a second type, we simulate
one-shot interaction by randomly rematching the countries in every period (the government-…rm pairs are
…xed in all treatments). As a consequence, we can control for the impact of repeated interaction.
In all, we consider our experiment not simply as an attempt to con…rm or reject the theory. It may also
give rise to new interpretations and modi…cations of the theory itself.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the underlying theory and the
experimental design, Section 3 reports the experimental results, and Section 4 concludes.
2 Theory and Experimental Design
In line with the Brander and Spencer (1985) model, we use linear demand and cost functions for our
experiment. More speci…cally, inverse demand was
p(q1;q2) = maxf60 ¡ q1 ¡ q2; 0g
where qi; i = 1;2; denotes …rm i’s output. In order to avoid negative pro…ts, we set constant marginal costs
equal to zero.
What is the prediction for this setup? Consider the second stage …rst. Government subsidies are linear
in quantity. The constant marginal subsidies are denoted by si;i = 1;2; and are known to both …rms.
Firms’ pro…ts are
p(q1;q2) ¢ qi + si ¢ qi = (maxf60 ¡ q1 ¡ q2; 0g + si) ¢ qi:
This yields
qi =
60 + 2si ¡ sj
3
; i = 1;2;j 6= i
as equilibrium quantities.
Then consider the government decision at the …rst stage. Governments decide simultaneously about
s1 and s2; respectively. Their objective is to maximize welfare in their respective countries. There is no
domestic consumption and exports go to a third country, so welfare is equal to net pro…ts, pqi. Maximizing
5this expression yields governments’ equilibrium subsidies. Governments choose s¤
1 = s¤
2 = 12 which yields
q¤
1 = q¤
2 = 24. By contrast, if governments choose s1 = s2 = 0, …rms produce q1 = q2 = 20 (the Cournot
equilibrium quantities of the duopoly without governments).
While this calculation is a straightforward exercise for trained economists, in the laboratory, this two–
stage game is of considerable complexity. Note that, for every (s1;s2) combination, there is a di¤erent
subgame with di¤erent subgame-perfect outputs. Such complexity might overload subjects which in the
end may lead to erratic decisions. Therefore, we simpli…ed the design as far as possible, maintaining all
features of the original model.
We restricted the governments’ strategy sets to only two choices corresponding to si = 0 (no subsidy)
and si = 12 (the equilibrium subsidy).2 This reduces the number of possible …rm subgames to four.
Restricting governments’ choices to polar cases also makes the strategic impact of the subsidy decision
more transparent.
We also restricted …rms’ strategy sets. As noted above, if both governments choose s1 = s2 = 0, …rms
should, from a normative point of view, produce q1 = q2 = 20. If both governments choose s1 = s2 = 12,
…rms’ optimal choice is q1 = q2 = 24. Finally, asymmetric choices of si = 12 and sj = 0 imply qi = 28 and
qj = 16. In principle, we let subjects choose from the set of these four quantities. An exception is that we
decided to include the quantity 15 rather than 16 as the …rst element in the strategy set, so …rms’ strategy
set was f15;20;24;28g.3 The reason is a conceptual problem. It is well known that Cournot games with a
discretized strategy space give rise to multiple equilibria because best replies are not unique (Holt, 1985).
With qi = 16; we do get multiple equilibria while, with qi = 15; this problem is resolved and we get a
unique equilibrium in all four subgames. Furthermore, note that qi = 15 corresponds to the symmetric
cartel output.
2The reader will note that si = 15 rather than si = 12 is the government’s best reply to sj = 0: However, the restricted
strategy set f0;12g simpli…es the design while subsidizing is still a dominant strategy for governments.
3Since the size of the quantities f15;20;24;28g is entirely meaningless to subjects (note that they did not know the model),
we labelled the strategies f1;2;3;4g instead. However, since the reader is familiar with the model and the equilibrium values,
we will refer to quantities f15;20;24;28g throughout the paper.
6This reduced game was presented to subjects by payo¤ tables rather than by the model’s parameters
and payo¤ functions. They are reproduced in Tables 1–4. In principle, they are derived from the above
linear model.
Output 15 20 24 28
15 450, 450 380, 500 310, 510 260, 480
20 500, 380 400, 400 320, 380 240, 340
24 510, 310 380, 320 290, 290 200, 230
28 480, 260 340, 240 230, 200 120, 120
Table 1: Firms’ payo¤s if neither …rm is subsidized
Consider …rms’ payo¤ tables …rst. If both governments choose si = 0, the payo¤ matrix of a …rm is as
in Table 1. It is easily checked that the entries result from rounding the pro…t (60¡q1¡q2)¢qi to multiples
of 10.4 Tables 2 and 3 involve subsidies which were computed as follows. We normalized the subsidy such
that, with qi = 15; the subsidy is zero.5 More precisely, the formula for the subsidy was (qi¡15)¢12 (again
subsequently rounded to multiples of 10). That is, with qi = 20 the subsidy is 60, with qi = 24 the subsidy
is 110, and with qi = 28 the subsidy 160. If both governments choose si = 12, the relevant …rm matrix is
the one in Table 2 where the appropriate subsidy is added for both …rms. If one government chooses si = 0
while the other one chooses sj = 12, the matrix shown in Table 3 results. Another table given to subjects
(not reproduced here) gave the payo¤s where the …rst …rm was subsidized while the second was not. This
table is somewhat redundant but it might have helped subjects to understand the game.
Table 4 is the governments’ pro…t table. Recall that in theory governments are supposed to maximize
welfare. Following the generally accepted “induced value approach” of Smith (1982), governments’ payo¤s
are according to welfare in their respective countries. Since exports are into a third country, welfare is simply
4To obtain unique best replies, we deviated from this rule in one case by rounding 315 to 310.
5If the subsidy was simply 12qi; …rms’ pro…ts would increase dramatically through subsidies. This would imply that
the strategic incentives become very small compared to the total payo¤s. Without the normalization, governments could
substantially increase e¢ciency through subsidizing, which again might dominate the strategic incentives (see also the design
of our treatment FixedPolicy* below).
7Output 15 20 24 28
15 450, 450 380, 560 310, 620 260, 640
20 560, 380 460, 460 380, 490 300, 500
24 620, 310 490, 380 400, 400 310, 390
28 640, 260 500, 300 390, 310 280, 280
Table 2: Firms’ payo¤s if both …rms are subsidized
Output 15 20 24 28
15 450, 450 380, 560 310, 620 260, 640
20 500, 380 400, 460 320, 490 240, 500
24 510, 310 380, 380 290, 400 200, 390
28 480, 260 340, 300 230, 310 120, 280
Table 3: Firms’ payo¤s if the column …rm is subsidized, while the row …rm is not
the net pro…t of the …rm. Note that this implies that the subsidies have no direct e¤ect on the payo¤s
of governments.6 They matter only indirectly as they change incentives for the …rms. As a consequence,
there is just one payo¤ table for governments which depends only on …rms’ outputs and not on the subsidy
decision.
Note further that …rms’ pro…ts and governments’ payo¤s were of di¤erent magnitudes. More precisely,
…rms’ (net) pro…ts were divided by 5 to obtain governments’ payo¤s. This was done in order to avoid payo¤
comparisons within a government-…rm pair. Such inter-personnel payo¤ comparisons might trigger behav-
ioral patters we cannot control for and they might bias the results. In order to equalize average payments
of the governments and …rms, we used di¤erent (commonly known) exchange rates when converting the
experimental payments into Deutschemarks (see below).
Analyzing these tables shows that the game can be solved by iterated elimination of dominated strate-
gies. The subgame perfect output choices coincide, of course, with those derived above. With s1 = s2 = 0,
…rms produce 20 each; with s1 = s2 = 12, …rms produce 24 each; si = 12 and sj = 0 imply qi = 28 and
6If governments actually had to pay the subsidy (e.g., from an initial capital provided by the experimentator) this would
reduce the incentive to subsidize production. The Brander and Spencer prediction would no longer be valid.
8Output 15 20 24 28
15 90, 90 76, 100 62, 102 52, 96
20 100, 76 80, 80 64, 76 48, 68
24 102, 62 76, 64 58, 58 40, 46
28 96, 52 68, 48 46, 40 24, 24
Table 4: Governments’ payo¤, dependent on …rms’ output
qj = 15. Analyzing the governments’ payo¤s resulting from these decisions shows that the equilibrium at
the government level is to subsidize.
We now turn to further issues of the experimental design. Subjects continued to act either as a govern-
ment or as a …rm for the entire course of the experiment. All …ve payo¤ tables and the instructions sheets
were, however, given to all subjects before they knew which role they would play. Government–…rm pairs
remained …xed over all periods.
Our two treatment variables concerned the labelling of subsidies and the form of interaction between
the government-…rm pairs. The term “subsidize” may not be a neutral term to our participants. On the
one hand, from economics classes, subjects might be biased against subsidies because they were taught
that free trade is the best policy. On the other hand, they may also be biased in favor of subsidies because
“head to head” and globalization rhetorics makes them think they should adopt an active policy. We
therefore labelled these actions in one treatment condition “don’t subsidize” and “subsidize,” respectively,
and in a second treatment condition we labelled the two actions “Policy A” and “Policy B” without further
describing the policy. Below, we will distinguish these two treatment conditions with the labels Subsidy
and Policy. (On the e¤ects of di¤erent labels in market experiments see, e.g., Ho¤man et al., 1994 and
Francicosi et al., 1995.)
Our second treatment variable concerned the form of interaction between government-…rm pairs. The
…rst treatment condition, labelled Fixed, has …xed duopoly pairs playing over all periods. In the second
treatment condition, labelled Random, duopolies were rematched in every period. Since two government-
…rm pairs might interact again at a later stage, this is no perfect simulation of one-shot encounters. Subject








Table 5: The treatments
(1985) theory is formulated as a one-shot interaction, in the …eld the interaction might rather be repeated.
Hence our Random treatment closely maps the theoretical model, whereas our Fixed treatment arguably
better re‡ects …eld settings. Together with the treatment variable “label,” we obtain the 2x2 design dis-
played in Table 5.
After running the sessions for these four treatments, we decided to introduce a …fth treatment. This
treatment is called FixedPolicy*. The same motivation which led us to normalize the subsidy (see
footnote 5 above) applies here. In line with the Brander and Spencer (1985) model, the subsidies in our
experiments are donations from the governments to the …rms that do not a¤ect welfare and therefore the
governments’ payo¤s. This may be problematic since governments could choose to subsidize to directly
increase …rms’ payo¤s out of generosity rather than for strategic reasons.7 This implies that if …rms do not
play the subgame perfect equilibrium, it is not entirely clear whether governments subsidize for strategic
or altruistic reasons or due to concerns for e¢ciency, which both might be more relevant in the laboratory
than in the …eld. Therefore we conducted the control treatment FixedPolicy*. This treatment di¤ered
from FixedPolicy by a reduction of the payo¤ of a subsidized …rm by 80 points for any combination of
quantity decisions. This leaves the strategic incentives for …rms and governments unchanged but eliminates
altruistic subsidies: subsidies only increase the …rms’ payo¤ for quantities 24 and 28, whereas they reduce
…rms’ payo¤ for quantities 15 and 20. We chose treatment FixedPolicy as a point of departure for two
reasons. First, a negative subsidy seems rather strange, whereas a policy may plausibly have negative e¤ects
7In treatment FixedPolicy, there was one striking example of this behavior. One government chose “Policy A” in all ten
periods while the other goverment chose “Policy B” in seven periods. Firms, however, entirely ignored the strategic incentives
and colluded on quantity 15 in all periods except the last.
10for small quantities and positive for large quantities. Therefore the Policy frame seems more appropriate.
Second, collusive behavior of the …rms and thus altruistic subsidizing seems more likely in the case of Fixed
matching.
For all treatments, we conducted two sessions with 12 subjects participating in each session. In treat-
ments with random matching, all six government–…rm pairs interacted; with …xed matching, three groups
of four subjects interacted but subjects could not tell with whom they were matched.
The markets lasted for 10 periods. At the beginning of each period, governments had to choose whether
or not to subsidize their …rms (or alternatively, choose “Policy B” or “Policy A”). The subsidy decisions
were made public to all four participants on computer screens afterwards. Then …rms had to choose outputs.
After that, output decisions were revealed to all four participants and the resulting payo¤s were disclosed
individually.
Exchange rates were such that governments got one Deutschemark for every 40 “points” and …rms
got one Deutschemark for every 200 “points”. Average earnings were DM 19:30: Sessions lasted between
70 and 90 minutes. The experiments were conducted in the experimental computer lab of Humboldt
University, Berlin. In total, 120 students, mainly from the Department of Business Administration and
Economics, participated. For the computerized experiment we used the software tool kit z-Tree, developed
by Fischbacher (1999). Translated instructions are provided in the Appendix.
3 Results
We start with the governments’ decisions at stage one. Table 6 contains the “subsidize”8 decisions in the
…ve treatments over the ten periods. In total, roughly 50% of the government decisions were “subsidize”
decisions. Based on a binomial test, we cannot reject the hypothesis that “subsidize”/“don’t subsidize”
decisions are equiprobable for all treatments taken together. Considering the treatments individually, in
RandomSubsidy and FixedPolicy*, there are signi…cantly more “don’t subsidize” decisions (binomial
test, 5%-level).
8For simplicity, we use the term “subsidize” also for “Policy B” decisions whenever this does not create confusion.
11Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total
RandomSubsidy 11 7 7 4 4 3 2 4 2 3 47 (120)
RandomPolicy 8 8 6 5 8 10 7 7 5 6 70 (120)
FixedSubsidy 5 6 7 6 7 5 9 7 5 5 62 (120)
FixedPolicy 9 4 5 6 6 7 7 5 5 5 59 (120)
P
33 25 25 21 25 25 25 23 17 19 238 (480)
FixedPolicy* 3 5 4 3 4 4 3 5 5 4 40 (120)
Table 6: Number of “subsidize" choices across periods (maximum: 12)
Importantly, the “subsidize” decisions were not positively correlated with time in any treatment. In
RandomSubsidy and in all treatments taken together, there was a signi…cant negative time trend (at the
1% and the 5% level, respectively). A similar result is that there is an end-game e¤ect in all treatments
in the sense that there are fewer “subsidize” decisions in the last period (last two periods) compared to
periods 1-9 (1-8). This end-game e¤ect is signi…cant at the 1% level for the Random treatments in the
last two periods (OLS with period 10/periods 9 and 10 as explanatory variables).9
What was the impact of the treatments on the governments’ decisions? Based on the “subsidize”
decisions, our two treatment variables do not lead to signi…cant di¤erences. That is, both the Random
versus the Fixed treatments and the Subsidy versus the Policy treatments are not signi…cantly di¤erent
(binomial test, 5%-level). As we argued above, there are possible reasons for e¤ects in either direction
concerning the Subsidy versus Policy labelling. So, ex post it may appear not to be surprising that
there are no di¤erences. The result that Random versus Fixed matching does not have an impact is,
however, quite surprising. In comparable prisoners’ dilemma experiments (e.g., Cooper et al., 1996), there
is typically signi…cantly more cooperation with …xed matching. This suggests that there should have been
fewer “subsidize” decisions in the Fixed treatments, but we do not observe such an e¤ect. We cannot,
however, preclude that there would have been such an e¤ect if we had conducted substantially more than
9Note that this end game e¤ect is in opposite direction to those e¤ects typically observed in repeated games. We would,
however, not interpret this in a way that governments become more cooperative towards the end, but rather that they learn
that subsidizing does not pay, as outlined below.
1210 periods.
The only signi…cant treatment e¤ect in the data is that FixedPolicy* has signi…cantly fewer “Policy
B” (i.e., “subsidize”) decisions than FixedPolicy (binomial test, 5%-level). The number of decisions to
subsidize in the control treatment FixedPolicy* is also substantially lower than in the other treatments
(though these …gures cannot, of course, be directly compared). Thus, it seems that some of the subsidy
choices are driven not by strategic considerations but by generosity of the governments towards the …rms.
This implies that the motivation of governments to “subsidize” is presumably less well captured by the
Brander and Spencer (1985) theory than the numbers of “subsidize” choices in the four main treatments
suggest.
To summarize the data on the “subsidize” decisions, there are few such decisions and there is no indica-
tion of a learning trend towards the equilibrium. No individual treatment suggests a di¤erent interpretation
of the data. We conclude that the experimental data do not support the Brander and Spencer (1985) theory
at the government level.
We now turn to the second stage, the output decisions of the …rms. Table 7 shows the average industry
output levels by treatment and by subgame in the second half of the experiment. The table also contains the
average individual output in the asymmetric subgames. Industry output roughly matches the prediction in
all treatments. Industry output is below the prediction in the B/B subgames for all treatments, and output
is also lower than predicted, at least for the Fixed treatments, in the A/A subgames. In the asymmetric
subgames, output is sometimes above, sometimes below the prediction. In all, the theory seems to predict
well as all observed values for mean industry output are within one standard deviation of the prediction.
The most interesting aspect of the data are the individual output decisions in the asymmetric subgames.
The average output of the subsidized …rm is substantially lower than predicted, while that of the …rm that
is not subsidized substantially exceeds the prediction. Except for treatment RandomSubsidy, subsidized
…rms chose an average output of 24 or below. The predicted di¤erence in output between the …rm which is
subsidized and the one which is not is 13. In RandomSubsidy, the di¤erence is only 7:5 and even smaller
in the other treatments. In FixedPolicy, it is as small as 2:86. These deviations are possibly based









































































Table 7: Average observed industry output in subgames, standard deviation in parentheses, # number of
observations
Ockenfels (2000) have recently extended the general economic paradigm (maximization of own well being)
to allow for inequality aversion. These theories (see Engelmann and Strobel, 2002, for an experimental
comparison of these two theories) are able to rationalize a number of phenomena in experiments that the
traditional theory failed to do so. Inequality aversion is a likely explanation for the deviation from the
subgame perfect outputs in the asymmetric subgames.
Note that in our setup, the equalization of pro…ts can be obtained at a relatively low cost. In equilibrium,
the non-subsidized …rm i would produce qi = 15; while the subsidized …rm j would produce qj = 28: This
implies payo¤s of 260 for i and 640 for j (see Table 3). If i deviates to 20, the payo¤s are 240 and 500.
Thus, at a cost of 20, i can reduce the negative inequality by 120 (from 380 to 260). On the other hand, by
deviating from 28 to 24, j can reduce the positive inequality from 380 to 310 at a cost of 20 (if i chooses





















































































Table 8: Numbers of …rms and …rm pairs playing the equilibrium strategy and the equilibrium for all possible
subgames. (a) pairs in subgame, (b) pairs in equilibrium, (c) …rms playing the equilibrium strategy, (d)
non-subsidized …rms playing the equilibrium strategy, (e) subsidized …rms playing the equilibrium strategy.
negative inequality from 310 to 170 by choosing 20 instead of 15. Thus, even moderate inequality aversion
of both i and j implies outputs qi = 20 and qj = 24:
One might argue that for the individual decisions in the asymmetric subgames, deviations from the
prediction were only possible in one direction. However, our above interpretation of the aggregate data
is in line with the decisions of individual pairs in single periods (see Table 8, which also shows the most
individual deviations in the asymmetric subgames). In total there were 124 asymmetric subgames. Only
16 (12:9%) of these resulted in the equilibrium quantities (qi = 15;qj = 28) while 22 (17:8%) of the pairs
played the combination (qi = 20;qj = 24): Analyzing the data for the two …rms separately shows that 44
(35:5%) of the non-subsidized …rms chose the equilibrium quantity while 59 (47:6 %) chose qi = 20: Of the
subsidized …rms, 43 (34:7%) chose the equilibrium quantity while 42 (33:9 %) chose qj = 24. In contrast,
in the 77 symmetric subgames with both …rms subsidized, 16 (20:8%) of the pairs played the equilibrium
strategy and 68 (44:2%) of the individuals chose the equilibrium output. In the 99 symmetric subgames
15Theory don’t subsidize subsidize
don’t subsidize 80:00;80:00 52:00;96:00
subsidize 96:00;52:00 58:00;58:00
Experimental data don’t subsidize subsidize
don’t subsidize 80:41;80:41 62:83;77:77
subsidize 77:77;62:83 61:86;61:86
Table 9: Governments’ expected payo¤s, theory (top) and experimental data (bottom)
with none of the …rms being subsidized even 38 (38:4%) of the pairs ended up at the equilibrium and
117 (59:1%) of the individuals chose the equilibrium output. Thus, it does not seem to be the case that
subjects were unable to …gure out the equilibrium, rather they seem unwilling to play it in the asymmetric
subgames.
We saw that subjects acting as …rms do not conform to the equilibrium prediction in the asymmetric
subgames. Obviously, this must have consequences for the governments. We analyze the impact …rm
behavior has on governments by computing the ex-post realized payo¤s of the governments in the four main
treatments.10 The top of Table 9 shows the reduced government game given subgame-perfect behavior of
…rms. This is the normal prisoners’ dilemma with “subsidize” being the dominant strategy. However,
the payo¤ table of the governments that results from experimental …rm behavior (see the bottom part in
Table 9) shows that subsidizing ceases to be a dominant strategy. In fact, “don’t subsidize” is now the
dominant strategy. The non-subgame perfect behavior of the …rms resolves the prisoners’ dilemma for the
governments. Given actual …rm behavior, it is rational for governments not to subsidize.
10This is based on data from periods 6-10. Qualitatively, the same picture results for all …ve treatments separately. Including
data from earlier periods also shows a similar, though less pronounced, picture.
164 Conclusions
In this paper, we have reported on experiments designed to test the model of strategic trade policy as
developed by Brander and Spencer (1985). Our data are not consistent with the theoretical prediction.
Governments subsidize …rms in too few cases to give conclusive evidence in favor of the theory. Over
time, the number of subsidy decisions decreases, again suggesting a departure from the prediction. At the
…rm level, we found that the subgame perfect prediction fails in subgames in which one …rm is subsidized
while the other is not. This failure might be attributed to inequality aversion. Given …rms’ decisions,
governments’ reluctance to subsidize is rational.
We have isolated the strategic incentives in a setup where the Brander and Spencer (1985) theory should
work best and have abstracted from any confounding factors that could be present in the …eld. Hence our
results cast at least some doubts on the theory’s relevance for …eld settings. We see the burden of proof on
the part of the proponents of the theory to argue why in the presence of confounding factors the prediction
based purely on the strategic situation should match the results more closely than in the isolated setup
studied here.
Our results can be compared with related experimental studies. On the one hand, our results are in
line with the studies on quantity competition in oligopoly by Huck et al. (2000, 2001a,b). Closely related
is the work of Huck et al. (2000), which analyzes strategic delegation in a Cournot duopoly. Their analysis
is based on the work of Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987). While the strategic situation of
these models is equivalent to the Brander and Spencer (1985) model, our experiments di¤er in the design
and (partly) in the results to those of Huck et al. (2000). While the di¤erences in design make a direct
comparison of the results impossible, it appears that the theory is even more rigorously rejected in that
paper. Huck et al. (2001a,b) analyze Stackelberg duopolies. They …nd considerable deviations from the
subgame perfect equilibrium prediction as the empirical response function of the Stackelberg followers was
partly upward sloping. As in this paper, inequality aversion seems to be the explanation for this behavior.
A second parallel to this paper is that the behavior of the second movers heavily in‡uences that of the …rst
movers. In Huck et al. (2001a), the roles of the Stackelberg leader and follower were exogenously assigned.
The follower behavior led to signi…cant reductions in the outputs of the Stackelberg leaders. In Huck et
17al. (2001b), Stackelberg leader/follower equilibria are predicted to emerge endogenously in a model with
two production periods, but there was no such evidence of endogenous Stackelberg leadership in the data.11
On the other hand, fairness considerations seem to be quite in‡uential in our results when compared to
a frequently observed e¤ect in experimental economics. When experiments are framed as markets, fairness
and inequality considerations usually have a much smaller impact than in experiments with a neutral design
(Ho¤man et al., 1994; Francicosi et al., 1995). Of course, we cannot exclude the possibility that if terms
like “…rm”, “market”, or “government” were not used, fairness and inequality considerations would be even
stronger in our data. However, given our market labelling, the fairness e¤ects do seem to be rather strong.
We see two interesting avenues for future research here. First, it would seem interesting to extend our
research to a case in which …rms are asymmetric anyway, e.g., due to di¤erences in marginal cost (Neary,
1994). It might be that the kind of inequality aversion we observe is less pronounced in such games because
there already exist asymmetries which may be economically justi…ed. Another extension would be to allow
for larger strategy spaces. Possibly such extended strategy spaces would give rise to more subsidy decisions
since subjects no longer have to focus on the extreme cases. In addition, …rms could then deviate in both
directions in the asymmetric subgames. However, this design would also be considerably more complex, so
it seems doubtful whether a clear picture would emerge in the data.
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Please read these instructions carefully. Do not talk to your neighbors during the course of the experi-
ment. Raise your hand if you have any questions. We will then come to your booth.
In this experiment you will have to make decisions repeatedly. By making these decisions you can earn
money. How much you earn depends on your decisions and on the decisions of three other participants. All
participants receive the same instructions.
21You will remain anonymous to us and to the other participants.
You are in a market with two …rms. The …rms are located in two di¤erent countries. The market for
the good that the …rms supply is in a third country. It is thus an export market from the perspective of
the …rms.
The conditions under which the …rms produce are in‡uenced by the governments in the two countries.
That is, the …rms can be subsidized by the governments of their respective country [Policy TREAT-
MENTS: Precisely, the governments can choose from di¤erent economic policies]. (how this works exactly
will be described below). You will make decisions for a government or for a …rm.
The experiment runs over 10 rounds. In each of the rounds the sequence of decisions is as follows.
At the beginning of each round the governments decide whether or not to subsidize the …rms. [Policy
TREATMENTS: ... choose their economic policies.] These decisions will be publicly announced afterwards.
Then the …rms decide upon the quantity they want to supply.
The subsidy [Policy TREATMENTS: policy] and quantity decisions determine the pro…ts of the …rms
and the revenues of the governments as can be seen in the …ve accompanying payo¤ tables.
Consider …rst the governments’ decisions. There are two options: to subsidize or not to subsidize. This
determines the conditions for the …rms’ pro…ts as follows.
[Policy TREATMENTS: There are two options: Economic Policy A or economic policy B. The eco-
nomic policy determines the conditions for the …rms’ pro…ts as follows. Subsequently replace subsidy
decisions with policy decisions, subsidy with Policy B and no subsidy with Policy A]
If neither governments subsidizes, the …rst payo¤ table is relevant for the …rms. If, from the perspective
of a …rm, the own government has decided to subsidize, while that of the other country has not, the second
table is relevant. If only the government of the other country has decided to subsidize it is the other way
round, the third table is relevant. Finally, if both have decided to subsidize, the fourth table is relevant.
Consider now the …rms’ decisions. Knowing the subsidy decisions, the …rms choose the quantity of the
good they produce and sell. There are four possible quantities: 1, 2, 3, and 4. Depending on the two
quantities, the …rms’ pro…ts and the governments’ revenues result according to the relevant tables.
22A …rm’s pro…t table has the following form. Your own quantity decision (quantity 1, 2, 3, or 4) is noted
at the left of each row of the table, the quantity decision of the other …rm at the top of each column. Since
there are four possible quantities, there are sixteen possible combinations or cells in the table.
The pro…ts are computed as follows. There are two numbers in each of the sixteen cells. On the left is
the own pro…t, on the right is the other …rms’ pro…t.
The table for the government has the same structure. Depending on the quantity decisions of the …rms,
one of the sixteen cells of the revenue table is relevant. Here, again, the own government’s revenue is on
the left and the other governments’ revenue is on the right.
Before the start of the experiment, we will use an example to explain the tables once again in detail.
Your payo¤ at the end of the experiment results from the pro…ts or revenues you have earned during
the ten rounds. For payo¤s in Deutschemarks the …rms’ pro…ts will be exchanged at a rate of 200 points
= 1 DM, the governments’ revenues at a rate of 40 points = 1 DM.
Finally, consider once again the exact sequence of events. As soon as the …rst round starts, both
governments decide whether or not they will subsidize their …rm. As soon as this is done all participants
in one market will be informed about both decisions. Then both …rms have to make their …rst quantity
decisions (knowing the subsidy decisions and hence the relevant pro…t table). As soon as these are made,
all participants are again informed about both decisions. In addition, all participants are informed about
their own pro…t or revenue that results from the decisions.
Then a new round starts and decisions can be made anew.
Each participant will keep the role (government or …rm) over the ten rounds. A government will stay
with the same …rm for all ten rounds. The second government-…rm pair, with whom you interact in the
market, will be randomly selected anew in each round.
[Fix TREATMENTS: Furthermore, the second government-…rm pair, with whom you interact in the
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